内容简介

Why did Napoleon succeed in 1805 but fail in 1812? Could the European half of World War II have been ended in 1944? These are only two of the many questions that form the subject-matter of this meticulously researched, lively 2004 book. Drawing on a very wide range of sources, van Creveld examines the specifics of war: namely, those formidable problems of movement and supply, transportation and administration, so often mentioned - but rarely explored - by the vast majority of books on military history. In doing so he casts his net far and wide, from Gustavus Adolphus to Rommel, from Marlborough to Patton, subjecting the operations of each to a thorough analysis from an unusual point of view. In this edition with a new introduction, van Creveld revisits his now-classic text, and comments in a new afterword on the role of logistics in high-tech, modern warfare.

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豆瓣评论

  • saidelizi
    划时代的后勤学经典,国内出版的后勤专业书籍,30年内国内应无人能超过这本译著。我们对军事行动的评价要么是对战胜者捧上天的溢美,要么是对失败者无尽的诋毁,可惜事实并不如此,普法战争的胜利并非如我们表面理解的那样来自铁路的运用,而耗尽十年之力精心设计的施里芬计划在后勤方面却是完全异想天开,拿破仑的征俄行动在后勤上的做法并不比一战的德军做的差,隆美尔在北非连串的战术胜利完全是作秀,没有任何意义。从后勤的角度来说军事行动永远远远无法做到及格分,从后勤的角度更有理由相信战争是局内的任何人都不愿采取的手段,战争是对人性的摧残03-26
  • eastvirginia
    虽然成书于40年前,至今仍然是军队后勤史最重要的著作。11-12
  • shumi2
    读了80年代的中译本(可能是节译),仅仅是陆军后勤史,截止于二战,不过瘾。“战略,在很大程度上成了后勤的附庸。。。”10-30
  • [已注销]
    对各个时期的战争后勤有很透彻的分析,提出有时战略完全是为了满足后勤的需要,不亏是有深入研究的行家里手06-30
  • Praetoria
    和E情初期对照,这书给人印象较深的一点是,专业条线的上层大统筹常会因为重供给、轻接收而拉胯:军需部门(保供部门)外包的供应商(保供企业)习惯用铁路(冷链大卡车)大批发货,但铁路替代不了马车(轻型车队、面包车、翻斗车、平板车),不少铁路站点(街镇)缺少向前线部队(居村)运输的工具和自筹资源,导致各类补给就地囤积;补给系统、运输部门、站点间不协调,建制车队各行其是,到了中期,大卡直送居村的空白点才慢慢扫清。问题规模大到一定程度的时候,“专业的人干专业的事”总是必要但有限度。07-09

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